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The Mackay Radio Doctrine of Permanent
Striker Replacements and the Minnesota
Picket Line Peace Act: Questions of
Preemption
Michael H. LeRoy*
I. INTRODUCTION
Minnesota recently passed the Picket Line Peace Act,'
making it illegal for an employer to hire permanent replace-
ments for striking workers. The Act is notable in part because,
in 1992, Congress came close to enacting nearly identical fed-
eral legislation, failing to do so despite strong support from la-
bor organizations such as the AFL-CIO. 2 The Minnesota law is
also notable on its own terms for three reasons.
First, the Picket Line Peace Act addresses the balance of
bargaining power between workers and employers.3 A growing
number of employers with union-represented employees are
hiring or threatening to hire permanent replacements when
* Michael H. LeRoy is an Assistant Professor, Institute of Labor and In-
dustrial Relations, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. A.B., Univer-
sity of Illinois, 1978; A.M., Labor and Industrial Relations, University of
Illinois, 1981; M.A., Political Science, University of Illinois, 1983; J.D., Univer-
sity of North Carolina, 1986. Special thanks to Matt Finkin for a critical read-
ing of an early draft and to Larry Kahn and Janet LeRoy for their very
helpful editorial guidance. Stimulating discussions with Tom Mengler and
David Olien led to this article.
1. Act of June 1, 1991, ch. 239, sec. 1, § 179.12(9), 1991 Minn. Laws 728,
729.
2. See S. 55, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) and H.R. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991), both proposing to make it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
offer, or to grant, the status of permanent replacement employee to an individ-
ual performing bargaining unit work for the employer during a labor dispute."
Although the bill passed in the House, it was defeated when Senator Orin
Hatch threatened a filibuster and supporters fell three votes short to invoke
cloture. Senate Vote Kills Bill to Restrict Use of Permanent Striker Replace-
ments, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 117, at A-9 (June 17, 1992) [hereinafter Sen-
ate Vote Kills Bill].
3. See Act of June 1, 1991, ch. 239, sec. 1, § 179.12(9), 1991 Minn. Laws
728, 729.
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their employees strike.4 This departs from the previous em-
ployer practice of hiring temporary replacements to work only
through a strike.5 An employer does not dismiss permanent
striker replacements once a strike is ended. Strikers whose po-
sitions are filled by permanent replacements, therefore, do not
automatically return to their jobs. 6 Instead, they are placed on
a reinstatement list,7 and years may pass before they return to
work, if they do so at all. Thus, by hiring permanent striker
replacements, increasing numbers of employers have turned
strikes, intended by Congress as the workers' "weapon" of self-
help for furthering collective bargaining, into their own
"weapon." As a result, unions today are less likely to strike,
and because they have lost an essential bargaining lever, their
labor agreements have provided union workers weak gains or
even "give-backs" to employers.8 Minnesota's Picket Line
Peace Act appears to restore the balance of bargaining power
between workers and employers.
Second, the title and legislative history of the Act empha-
size public safety.9 The hiring of permanent striker replace-
ments often causes extreme tension in communities affected by
strikes, and sometimes leads to violence. Employers may seek
to hire people in the community as permanent replacements,
causing strikers, who already perceive themselves to be making
a large financial sacrifice, to lash out with vengeance at the
people who cross their picket line to take their jobs. In Austin,
Minnesota, this situation occurred during the 1985-86 United
Food & Commercial Workers' strike against Geo. A. Hormel &
Co., the nation's largest meatpacker. 10 The strike provoked
such violence that Minnesota's Governor, Rudy Perpich, called
out the National Guard to restore public order.:" The strike
has left a continuing legacy of unrest and disquiet in Austin.12
The Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act, passed in the aftermath
of the Hormel strike, has a significant public safety dimension
4. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
5. Senate Vote Kills Bill, supra note 2, at A-9.
6. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967).
7. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99
(7th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
8. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
9. See Minnesota Court Upholds Striker Bill, Rejecting Federal Preemp-
tion Argument, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at A-9 (Feb. 28, 1992) [hereinaf-
ter Minnesota Court Upholds Striker Bill].
10. See infra text accompanying notes 66-89.
11. See infra note 71.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 86-89.
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in addition to its labor policy dimension.' 3
Third, the Minnesota statute has the potential to reshape
federal labor law. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in dictum in
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.-4 that employers have
a right to hire permanent striker replacements.15 The Court
failed to provide any basis for its newly announced doctrine and
seemingly contradicted an express statutory prohibition against
diminishing or interfering with a worker's right to strike.
16
Mackay Radio remains, however, valid precedent. In the 1980s,
three Supreme Court decisions built on Mackay Radio, each
having serious, negative consequences for a worker's right to
strike.'7 The Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act may now bring
Mackay Radio into question.
The Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act highlights the para-
doxes created by Mackay Radio and its progeny. No one doubts
the precedential value of Mackay Radio; because the perma-
nent replacement doctrine is rooted in dictum rather than law,
however, it is fair to ask whether that doctrine should preempt
a state law embodying a conflicting policy. The question be-
comes particularly pointed given the growing tendency under
the Burger-Rehnquist Court to construe statutes literally.'8
Since the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") expressly
prohibits any judicial construction that interferes with, im-
pedes, or diminishes in any way the right to strike, should Mac-
kay Radio's contrary dictum survive the protective construction
demanded by the federal statute? Also, the Supreme Court
ruled in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale'9 that permanent replacements
who were dismissed by their employer could maintain state
lawsuits for breach of contract and misrepresentation, thereby
subjecting employers to conflicting and potentially costly state
and federal labor regulation. 20 If the Court is willing to permit
state common law claims for breach of contract and misrepre-
13. See Minnesota Court Upholds Striker Bill, supra note 9 at A-9.
14. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
15. Id. at 345-46.
16. See id. at 345 (quoting National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372,
§ 13, 49 Stat. 449, 457 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988)).
17. See infra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing Trans World Air-
lines v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989); Pattern
Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S.
491 (1983)).
18. Joseph T. Sneed, The Art of Statutory Interpretation, 62 TEX. L. REV.
665, 675 (1983).
19. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
20. Id. at 497.
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sentation to share the field of strike settlement with the
NLRA, should the Court deny the Minnesota Legislature au-
thority to enact the Picket Line Peace Act-especially when
Minnesota's statute, unlike the Kentucky state claims in Bel-
knap, is a traditional exercise of the state's police power to pro-
tect public safety? The Picket Line Peace Act is therefore
significant not only for its potential impact on collective bar-
gaining but also for its potential to compel the Court either to
articulate a rationale for Mackay Radio's policy of permanent
striker replacements-which it failed to do in 1938--or to repu-
diate that policy altogether.
This Article examines the policies underlying both the hir-
ing of permanent striker replacements and the enactment of
the Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act. It concludes that Mac-
kay Radio provided no rationale for ignoring the NLRA's ex-
press prohibition against diminishing the right to strike, and
consequently has upset the balance of bargaining power created
by Congress between employers and employees in favor of the
employers. The Picket Line Peace Act, in addition to serving
important public safety concerns, helps to correct that
imbalance.
II. THE NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY OF PERMANENT
STRIKER REPLACEMENTS
The NLRA established a federal policy permitting most
private sector employees to organize and to bargain collec-
tively21 over wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment with their employer.22 The public policy rationale
for the law was two-fold. Prior to enactment of the law, the
Supreme Court had interpreted the Due Process Clause to cur-
tail state power in legislating minimum employment stan-
dards.23 Moreover, as a result of immigrants flooding the
21. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (providing "[e]mployees ... the right to self or-
ganization ... to bargain collectively... and to engage in other concerted ac-
tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining....")
22. The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 ("TMRA") amended
the NLRA; among the changes it made, the LMRA defined collective bargain-
ing as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the rep-
resentative of employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(d), 61
Stat. 136, 142 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988)).
23. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New York
law prohibiting the employment of bakery employees in excess of 10 hours a
day or 60 hours a week); see also Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525
[Vol. 77:843
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nation during the height of the industrial period, labor supply
exceeded demand.24 As a consequence, the bargaining power of
employees vis-a-vis their employers was extremely low. One
explicit rationale for permitting employees to bargain collec-
tively, therefore, was to equalize their bargaining power with
employers. 25 Furthermore, the NLRA envisioned that more
equal bargaining power would redistribute wealth to workers
and improve their purchasing power, thereby benefitting the
depressed economy.2 6
To make collective bargaining effective for workers, the
NLRA legitimized certain economic pressures that workers
could muster in the course of negotiating with employers. The
most effective bargaining lever provided to workers was the
right to engage in concerted activity, specifically the right to
strike.27 Congress regarded the right to strike as so fundamen-
tal to collective bargaining that it safeguarded this right, pro-
viding that "[n]othing in this Act ... shall be construed so as
either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
right to strike. '28 The right to strike increased the likelihood
that employers would experience disruptions in their produc-
tion and provision of services, and by implication, incur at least
some loss of business, profits, and goodwill. The strike thus
(1923) (invalidating a District of Columbia minimum wage law for women).
But see Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding a maximum hour
restriction on manufacturing employment); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908) (upholding a law prohibiting women from working in laundries more
than 10 hours a day).
24. See Don D. Lescohier, Working Conditions, in HISTORY OF LABOR IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932, at 3, 19 (John R. Commons ed., 1935). Les-
cohier observed that "[t]he enormous immigration of 1880-84 facilitated the ef-
forts of employers to obtain immigrants as strikebreakers and wage levelers."
i& Moreover, "[e]mployers, during the period of industrial development after
1898, wanted labor-abundant labor, cheap labor, and always docile labor. The
wage earners ... wanted protection against labor that would undercut wages,
flood the labor market, and be difficult to organize." Id at 25. Notwithstand-
ing various regulations restricting immigration, from 1891 to 1900 3,678,564 im-
migrants entered the United States. Id. at 15 (table). Between 1901 and 1910,
8,695,386 immigrants entered the country; 5,735,811 immigrants entered be-
tween 1911 and 1920; and 3,399,120 entered between 1921 and 1931.
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (asserting the desirability of redressing the
"inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and employers").
26. I& (stating that the inequality of bargaining power "tends to aggravate
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing
power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of com-
petitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries").
27. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988).
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served as a significant inducement for employers to engage in
collective bargaining.
Shortly after the law was enacted, however, the Supreme
Court substantially curtailed the right to strike. In NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,2 9 national officers for the
American Radio Telegraphists union called a strike to begin on
October 4, 1935, against the employer's San Francisco opera-
tions.3 0 Mackay Radio countered by hiring within three days a
sufficient number of replacement workers to render the strike
ineffective.3 ' Significantly, Mackay Radio induced its replace-
ment workers to come to San Francisco to work by promising
them an opportunity to "remain if they so desired,"32 which
meant that "the supervisor would have to handle the return of
the striking employees in such fashion as not to displace any of
the new men who desired to continue in San Francisco."
33
Thus, at the conclusion of the strike, Mackay Radio required
eleven strikers seeking to return to work to reapply for their
positions.3 4 Eventually, the employer reinstated all but five
strikers.35 These five were notable because they "were promi-
nent in the activities of the union and in connection with the
strike."36 In the resulting unfair labor practice proceedings, the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") found
that Mackay Radio had unlawfully discriminated against these
five workers on the basis of their union membership. 37 On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's anti-discrimina-
tion ruling.38
The Court's decision contained dictum, however, that went
well beyond the issue presented on appeal.39 The Court went
on to express the principle that employers may hire permanent
replacements for striking employees. The Court explained that
"it does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced
by the statute, has lost the right to protect and continue his
29. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
30. Id at 337.
31. Id
32. Id at 338.
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id at 338-39.
36. Id- at 339.
37. Id- at 340.
38. Id at 343.
39. See Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Eco-
nomic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 548.
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business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. '40 Amaz-
ingly, the Court stated this principle while at the same time
identifying language in the act requiring that courts not con-
strue the NLRA "so as to 'interfere with or impede or diminish
in any way the right to strike.' "41
Mackay Radio's approval of the hiring of permanent
striker replacements is plainly at odds with the NLRA's prohi-
bition against judicial construction that diminishes the right to
strike. Unfortunately, the Court announced this policy without
making any distinction between permanent and temporary
striker replacements. In theory, it should be more difficult for
employers to attract replacements for strikers if they promise
only temporary employment (i.e., employment only through
the strike). Replacements who cross a striking union's picket
line are generally subjected to verbal abuse and, occasionally,
physical violence. 42 Thus, working through a strike may be
unappealing to prospective replacements, unless the employer
can offer something more, such as permanent employment. In
that case, prospective replacements might find it worthwhile to
suffer the inconvenience, taunts, and pangs of conscience en-
tailed in crossing the strikers' picket line. The diminished
number of strikes in the 1980s and 1990s, when employers have
been increasingly willing to hire permanent striker replace-
ments, strongly suggests that the Mackay Radio doctrine has
indeed impaired, diminished, and interfered with the right to
strike.43
40. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345.
41. Id. (quoting National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 13, 49
Stat. 449, 457 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988)).
42. See infra notes 69-89 and accompanying text.
43. See infra note 44, documenting the sharp decline in strike frequency,
and notes 49-58, documenting the numerous uses of the permanent replace-
ment strategy. In the 1980s, the Supreme Court built on the Mackay Radio
doctrine in several cases that involved permanent striker replacement issues.
In Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983), the Court ruled that striker
replacements who were promised permanent employment, but were later dis-
missed as part of a strike settlement, could sue their employer for breach of
contract and misrepresentation. Id. at 512; see infra notes 151-59 and accompa-
nying text. Thus, the Court exposed employers to additional liability in the
form of separate claims from dismissed replacement workers if the employers
chose to settle strikes by returning strikers to their jobs.
In Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985), 11 strikers re-
signed their membership and returned to work after their union rejected the
employer association's settlement offer; the union fined these 11 members pur-
suant to its bylaws. 473 U.S. at 97-98. The NLRB ruled that the union com-
mitted an unfair labor practice by refusing to accept the members'
resignations, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's ruling. Id. at 98-
1993]
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III. IMPACT OF THE DIMINISHED RIGHT TO STRIKE
Since 1980, there has been both a sharp drop in the number
of work stoppages" and an increase in the expressed willing-
ness of employers to hire permanent replacements for strik-
ers.45 Roughly two-thirds of unions reported that employers
were much more likely to use the permanent replacement
strategy during the late 1980s than they were during the late
1970s.46 Although no study has established a relationship be-
tween growing employer willingness to hire permanent
replacements and the sharply diminished number of strikes,
100. Thus the unions lost their limited power to maintain solidarity by sanc-
tioning members who acted to break the strike.
In Trans World Airlines v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants,
5,000 flight attendants went out on strike after their contract expired. TWA
responded by hiring permanent replacements. 489 U.S. 426, 428-29 (1989). The
airline, still short-handed, appealed to strikers to abandon the picket line and
"crossover" to work; it offered the inducement of permanent basing in domi-
ciles vacated by continuing strikers. Id. at 429-30. Therefore, even though
continuing strikers might not have been permanently replaced, a crossover
from their bargaining unit might displace them from their domicile indefi-
nitely. Id. In short, the strategy pitted low-seniority strikers who could in-
stantly achieve a domicile placement that would otherwise take years to get
through the seniority system, against high-seniority strikers. Id. at 430. The
Court found that TWA did not commit an unfair labor practice in employing
this crossover strategy. Id at 442. The decision especially crippled the right to
strike, for in addition to endorsing the hiring of permanent replacements, it
allowed an employer to divide a union's membership by giving special treat-
ment to workers who broke ranks with their fellow strikers.
44. During the 1970s, major work stoppages, including both strikes and
lockouts, were much more numerous. In 1970, there were 381 work stoppages
involving 1,000 or more workers; in 1971, 298; in 1972, 250; in 1973, 317; in 1974,
424; in 1975, 235; in 1976, 231; in 1977, 298; in 1978, 219; and in 1979, 235. Bu-
REAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, COMPENSATION AND
WORKING CoNDrriONs 61 (table D-1) (1992). In 1980, however, there were only
187 such work stoppages; in 1981, 145; in 1982, 96; in 1983, 81; in 1984, 62; in
1985, 54; in 1986, 69; in 1987, 46; in 1988, 40; in 1989, 51; in 1990, 44; in 1991, 40;
and through May of 1992, 18. Id.
45. See GoVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS: STRIKES AND THE USE OF PERMANENT STRIKE REPLACEMENTS IN THE
1970s AND 1980s (1991). In 1985, 31% of the struck employers who were sur-
veyed declared their intention to hire permanent replacements for striking
workers; by 1989, this figure rose modestly to 35%. Id. app. III, at 20. An early
1992 survey of employers showed that 32% would hire replacements and that
48% would consider hiring replacements as a means of achieving their bargain-
ing goals. Robert L. Rose, Caterpillar's Success in Ending Strike May Curtail
Unions' Use of Walkouts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1992, at A3.
46. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 45, app. III, at 20.
In comparing employer use of the permanent replacement strategy in the late
1970s with the late 1980s, 63% of union respondents answered that the practice
was much less prevalent in the late 1970s, and 13% answered that the practice
was somewhat less prevalent. Id.
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the impact that the replacement strategy has had on union de-
cision making during the 1980s suggests such a relationship.
In part, the increased use of permanent replacements can
be attributed to their apparent effectiveness in dealing with a
number of highly visible strikes during the 1980s. The most no-
table of these, perhaps, was the air traffic controllers' strike of
1981. In response to the strike, then-President Reagan fired
more than 11,000 air traffic controllers, hiring permanent
replacements.47 Another prominent use of the permanent re-
placement strategy occurred during the 1985-86 strike at the
Hormel plant in Austin, Minnesota. 48 Other strikes in which
employers hired or threatened to hire permanent striker
replacements involved airlines,49 a major bus operator,s° coal5 '
and copper52 producers, paper mills,53 professional sports
47. See Herbert Northrup, The Rise and Demise of PATCO, 37 INDus. &
LAB. REL. REv. 167, 178-79 (1984) (discussing President Reagan's firing of
11,301 air traffic controllers in 1981).
48. See infra notes 66-89 and accompanying text.
49. Several major U.S. airlines used or threatened to use permanent
replacements during the 1980s and 1990s. Eastern Airlines contracted with
Orion Lift Services, Inc., to train and hire permanent replacements in January
1988 in anticipation of an impending strike. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Eastern
Airlines, 869 F.2d 1518, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Similarly, United Airlines, in an-
ticipation of a pilots' strike, trained 500 student pilots to be permanent replace-
ments. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. United Airlines, 802 F.2d 886, 892 (7th Cir.
1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987). In 1983, Continental Airlines hired ap-
proximately 1,000 permanent replacements after 1,800 Continental pilots
struck following the carrier's abrogation of its collective bargaining agreement
during bankruptcy reorganization. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S.
Ct. 1127, 1130 (1991).
50. In March of 1990, approximately 9,000 members of the Amalgamated
Transit Union struck Greyhound Lines, Inc. President of Striking Union Crit-
icizes Grejhound for Seeking Bankruptcy Protection, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 109, at A-15 (June 6, 1990). Greyhound continued to operate during the
strike by hiring more than 2,450 replacement drivers. Id When the strikers
offered unconditionally to return to work on May 22, the company denied
them reinstatement. I&L
51. During the 1989 strike by United Mine Workers against the Pittston
Coal Group, the company used replacements to continue its mining operations.
Michael deCourcy Hinds, Bitter Coal Strike May Be at End, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 1989, § 1, at 17.
52. In 1983, the United Steelworkers struck Phelps Dodge, a copper pro-
ducing firm in Arizona. United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge
Corp., 833 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989). Phelps
Dodge hired permanent replacements and violence ensued. End Nears for
Copper Strikers, CHI. TRm., July 7, 1985, at 5A. The permanent replacements
attacked the strikers by slashing their car tires, breaking a striker's jaw with a
rifle butt, making threatening phone calls to a striker's wife, and other acts.
Phelps Dodge, 833 F.2d at 807 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
53. In March 1987, International Paper locked out workers at its Mobile,
1993]
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teams5 4 and umpires,55 newspapers, 56 a heavy equipment manu-
facturer,57 and a major gun manufacturer.58 Unions and em-
ployers watched these and other strikes during the past decade
Alabama, plant, precipitating a strike by the International Paperworkers
Union at three of the employer's other paper mills. Adrienne M. Birecree,
Capital Restructuring and Labour Relations: The International Paper Strike,
in 1 INTERNATIONAL CONTRMUTIONS TO LABOUR STUDIES 59, 72-73 (1991). In-
ternational Paper hired temporary replacements for workers at the Mobile
mill and permanent replacements for workers at the three struck plants. Id.
54. The National Football League used replacement players in three regu-
lar season games during the NFL Players' Association's 1987 strike. Michael
Goodwin, Not All Viewers Are Back From Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1987, at
D32.
55. All but two of 52 major league umpires went on strike at the begin-
ning of the 1979 baseball season. Umpires Call "Strike'--A Different Kind,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 16, 1979, at 8. The two major leagues drew
replacement umpires from the amateur, minor and semiprofessional leagues.
1d.
56. On July 18, 1985, three unions and nearly 1,000 employees struck the
Chicago Tribune. Sydney H. Scharberg, Can the Daily News Survive the Chi-
cago Slasher?, NEWSDAY, May 1, 1990, at 53. By the time the strike was over,
many striking workers had been replaced by permanent replacements. Id, On
May 17, 1992, 605 delivery drivers for the Pittsburgh Press and Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette struck over company plans to eliminate the jobs of 450 drivers.
Michael deCourcy Hinds, Pittsburgh Papers Publish, But Strikers Block
Trucks, N.Y.TIMES, July 28, 1992, at A9. After two months of not printing
either paper, the company began distributing copies of the papers using tempo-
rary replacement drivers. The company discontinued distribution after just
two days due to union and public pressure. Pittsburgh Papers Halt Publica-
tion After 2 Days, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1992, at A8. Several weeks later a
United States district court, in a rare victory for unions, refused to enjoin en-
forcement of the Pennsylvania Strikebreakers Act. Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Preate, 797 F. Supp. 436, 444 (W.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd, No. 92-3486, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 33096 (3d Cir. Nov. 3, 1992). The Act prohibits employment of "any
strikebreaker in place of an employee involved in a labor dispute." PA. CONS.
STAT. § 217.23(a) (1992).
57. Beginning in November 1991, nearly 13,000 members of the United
Auto Workers struck Caterpillar plants in Illinois and Pennsylvania. Bob
Secter, Caterpillar, UAW Agree to Talks But Cling to Demands, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 1992, at A20. In April 1992, Caterpillar announced its intention to
hire permanent replacements. Caterpillar set up a toll-free number for per-
manent replacement applicants and, according to an Illinois Bell Telephone
spokesperson, received as many as 30,000 phone calls per hour from applicants
nation-wide. Robert L. Rose, Thousands Respond to Caterpillar Ads to Replace
Strikers in Illinois, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1992, at A3.
58. After working for 10 months without a contract, approximately 1,000
workers at Colt Industries went out on strike. NLRB Administrative Law
Judge Finds Colt Strike Caused by Unfair Labor Practices, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 177, at A-11 (Sept. 14, 1989). Colt hired permanent replacement
workers, but an administrative law judge later ruled that Colt had prolonged
the strike through unfair labor practices and ordered the strikers reinstated.
Colt Told to Rehire 800 Strikers; Back Pay Is to Be in Millions, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1989, at B3.
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to assess the effectiveness of striking when an employer threat-
ens to hire, or actually hires, permanent replacements; they
have seen that, on balance, the unions lost these strikes deci-
sively.59 Furthermore unions have seen that employers are
more willing to hire permanent replacements and, accordingly,
that their members are more likely to lose their jobs.60
It is difficult to pinpoint the economic effect of the dimin-
ished right to strike. Between 1982 and 1991, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor's consumer price index rose 45.5%61 while
average wage and benefit gains under collective bargaining
agreements rose only 31.75%.62 In addition, a recent study
found that since 1983, "nonunion wage increases have consist-
ently exceeded those for union workers. By September 1989,
the union-nonunion differential in wage rates was smaller than
it had been in 1975.' 63 These disparities provide prima facie ev-
idence of the diminished bargaining power of unions in the
1980s and 1990s. It is difficult to determine, however, to what
extent employers' increased use of the permanent replacement
strategy caused this diminished bargaining power. Other fac-
tors, such as declining union density in particular industries"
and increased wage competition from foreign producers65 may
also be responsible for diminishing union bargaining power.
59. When a struck employer hires permanent replacements, the union ef-
fectively loses its ability to pressure collective bargaining, although the strike
may never technically end. See supra notes 49-50, 52-53, & 57 and accompany-
ing text for examples of such strikes.
60. Finkin, supra note 39, at 548 n.12.
61. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, CPI DE-
TAILED REPORT, Jan. 1992, at 81 (table 24). The CPI for January 1982 was 94.3;
the CPI for December 1991 was 136.2. I&
62. Mean wages and benefits under collective bargaining agreements cov-
ering 5,000 or more workers increased 2.8% in 1982; 3.0% in 1983; 2.8% in 1984;
2.7% in 1985; 1.6% in 1986; 2.6% in 1987; 2.5% in 1988; 3.4% in 1989; 3.2% in
1990; and 3.4% in 1991. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS, Mar. 1992, at 123 (table B-
23).
63. Kay E. Anderson et al., Measuring Union-Nonunion Earnings Differ-
ences, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1990, at 26, 34 (citation omitted).
64. Michael A. Curme et al., Union Membership and Contract Coverage
in the United States, 1983-1988, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 5, 8 (1990).
65. John M. Culbertson, Pauperized Workers Are Price of "Free" Trade,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1990, at A26.
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IV. IMPACT OF PERMANENT STRIKER
REPLACEMENTS IN MINNESOTA: THE 1985-86
HORMEL STRIKE
The United Food and Commercial Workers' Local P-9
strike against Geo. A. Hormel & Co. in Austin, Minnesota, pro-
vides a case study of a contemporary strike involving the hiring
of permanent replacements. It reveals the problems perma-
nent replacements can cause and the policies behind the Min-
nesota Picket Line Peace Act that the strike helped to
engender.
In 1982, workers at Hormel's Austin plant agreed to a
three-year contract that included a no-strike clause in exchange
for Hormel's commitment to make substantial investments in
its Austin plant.66 Just one year later, Hormel, grappling with
an industry-wide slump, pressed workers to accept a wage cut
to remain competitive.67 The workers refused to accept any
wage cut and, in 1984, the company unilaterally lowered wages,
precipitating a strike by 1,400 workers in August 1985.68 By
January 1986, Hormel was hiring replacement workers.69
The events that unfolded after Hormel announced it would
hire permanent replacements show how such a strategy, exe-
cuted on a large scale, raises public safety concerns for a com-
munity. In late January, Hormel announced that it would
reopen the struck plant, that over 2,000 people had applied for
permanent replacement positions, and that seventy-five strikers
already had returned to work.70 On January 22, Hormel re-
opened its plant-but only after 800 National Guard troops and
local police cordoned off streets from a freeway that led to the
plant to enable replacements and crossovers to enter without
obstruction.71 Meanwhile, the conflict spread; over 100 farmers
joined the strikers' picket line, and Local P-9 sent out "roving
pickets" to Hormel plants in Iowa and Wisconsin.72 Eventually,
the roving pickets spread to Hormel plants in Fremont, Ne-
braska and Dallas, Texas. Hundreds of union-represented
66. Developments in Industrial Relations, MONTHLY LAD. REV., Nov. 1986,
at 51, 52.
67. Id
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. William Serrin, Hormel Plant Shuts as Troops Arrive and Strikers
Thin Ranks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1986, at 12.
71. William Serrin, Hormel Opens Plant as Guardsmen Bar Strikers, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1986, at 12.
72. Id.
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workers honored these picket lines, refusing to go to work.73
Hormel responded by firing 350 workers at its Ottumwa plant,
sixty at its Fremont plant, and an undetermined number at its
Dallas plant.74
At the same time, immense economic and psychological
pressures were building on the strikers, who had been on strike
for six months at that point. For example, one striker, Elmer
Elsberry, faced strong urging from his wife, who had lost her
office job at Hormel due to the strike, and from his family to
return to work.7 5 He finally returned on January 13, but he re-
ceived twenty calls that same evening from union members
who urged him to return to the picket line.76 Elsberry finally
chose to return to the picket line, noting, "There's 200 people
inside telling you how great you are and 1,400 outside telling
you what a scum you are."'77
In late January, Governor Perpich withdrew the National
Guard, and before long a near-riot broke out at the plant.78 In-
deed, on January 31, strikers forced the plant to close. They
barricaded all plant entrances and littered the freeway exit to
the plant with tire-puncturing spikes.7 9 The county sheriff de-
scribed the incident as "mob rule."80 In early February, Minne-
sota officials investigated reports that Hormel food in
Minneapolis stores had been sabotaged.8 ' During this period,
police arrested two dozen strikers for blocking plant
entrances.8 2
Nonetheless, within one month of reopening its Austin
plant, Hormel rendered the strike meaningless. They hired
1,025 replacement workers, a sufficient number to achieve full
production.8 3 In September, the strike was going so poorly that
the international union put Local P-9 in trusteeship and negoti-
73. 3 Horml Plants Dismiss Hundreds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1986, at 15.
74. Id.
75. William Serrin, Strike by Meatpackers Splits Family Loyalties, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1986, at 7.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Hormel Reports Hiring Completed at Strikebound Minnesota Plant,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1986, at 16 [hereinafter Hiring Completed].
79. Hormel Strikers Close Plant Again, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1986, at 54.
80. Id.
81. Jail Sentences of 2 Hormel Strikers Stayed, Cm. TaiB., Feb. 5, 1986, at
4.
82. Labor Leader and Two Dozen Strikers Arrested at Hormel Plant, N.Y.
TiMEs, Feb. 7, 1986, at 12.
83. Hiring Completed, supra note 78, at 16.
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ated a strike settlement agreement that failed to provide for
the immediate reinstatement of strikers.84 By December, the
composition of Hormel's Austin workforce included 461 strike
crossovers, 594 permanent replacements, and 666 permanently
replaced strikers whom Hormel had placed on reinstatement
lists.aM
Austin, a community of 22,000, remained deeply affected by
the strike long after Hormel returned to normal production in
early 1986. On April 11, 1986, a rally for replaced strikers
erupted in violence. Police arrested seventeen union sympa-
thizers, and eight police officers were hospitalized after being
pelted with chunks of asphalt and sprayed with a chemical irri-
tant.86 By late December, 1986, Police Chief Donald Hoffman
reported that 275 incidents of strike-related vandalism had oc-
curred in the town.8 7 Contrasting comments made by those on
opposite sides of the dispute reflect the divisive nature of Hor-
mel's strategy. Jo Ellen Spear, a permanent replacement who
had been on welfare until she took a job at Hormel, observed:
"Even if they [Hormel] cut the benefits in half, I'll still have
more than I ever had.' 88 In contrast, Cindi Bellrichard, whose
husband continued to strike, stated: "We have relatives that
went into that plant I don't ever intend to speak to again. If I
see them on the street, they're going to be called scab."8 9
V. MINNESOTA'S LABOR LAW AND THE PICKET LINE
PEACE ACT
Minnesota law defines sets of private-sector employer and
worker unfair labor practices that parallel unfair labor prac-
tices under the NLRA.90 The state need not, however, inter-
pret its law in conformity with the NLRA91 Under state law,
for example, workers cannot strike while a collective bargain-
84. Hormel Strike: Bitter Aftermath for Minnesota Town, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 1986, at 17 [hereinafter Bitter Aftermath].
85. Id.
86. Violence Erupts at Rally for Meatpackers' Union, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 12,
1986, at 6.
87. Bitter Aftermath, supra note 84, at 17.
88. Kenneth B. Noble, For Ex-Hormel Workers, No Forgive and Forget,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1986, at 5.
89. Id.
90. Compare MINN. STAT. § 179.12 (1992), defining employer unfair labor
practices, and section 8(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988).
91. See Willmar Poultry Co. v. Jones, 430 F. Supp. 573 (D. Minn. 1977)
(ruling that AMinnesota was not obligated to interpret its statutory exclusion of
agricultural workers as if the NLRA's exclusion of such workers applied).
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ing agreement that bars striking is in effect;92 nor can they
strike unless a majority of the bargaining unit votes to do so by
secret ballot.9 3 These two restrictions on the right to strike do
not appear in the NLRA. Thus, although a strike in violation
of a contract that is not open to renegotiation does not violate
the NLRA, such a strike does violate Minnesota law.94
Minnesota law also regulates employer conduct during
strikes. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to black-
list union members from work because they strike,95 or to sub-
contract a union member's bargaining unit work for lower
wages than agreed upon in a labor contract,9 or to utilize pro-
92. MINN. STAT. § 179.11(1) (1992) (making it an unfair labor practice
"[f]or any employee or labor organization to institute a strike if such strike is a
violation of any valid collective agreement between any employer and his em-
ployees or labor organization and the employer is, at the time, in good faith
complying with the provisions of the agreement.. ").
93. MINN. STAT. § 179.11(8) (1992) (making it an unfair labor practice "for
any person or labor organization to cooperate in engaging in, promoting or in-
ducing a strike" unless, upon a vote, the majority "of the voting employees in a
collective bargaining unit of the employees of an employer or association of
employers against whom such strike is primarily directed" approve the strike).
The statute provides that "[s]uch vote shall be taken by secret ballot at an
election called by the collective bargaining agent for the unit, and reasonable
notice shall be given to all employees in the collective bargaining unit of the
time and place of election." Id
94. McLean Distribution Co. v. Brewery & Beverage Drivers Union Local
993, 94 N.W.2d 514, 521 (Minn.), cert denied, 360 U.S. 917 (1959).
95. MINN. STAT. § 179.12(6) (1992) (making it an unfair labor practice for
an employer "[t]o distribute or circulate a blacklist of individuals exercising a
legal right or of members of a labor organization for the purpose of preventing
individuals who are blacklisted from obtaining or retaining employment" (em-
phasis added)). The "retaining employment" provision could potentially pre-
vent an employer from reinstating a striker if the striker were blacklisted for
striking. Minnesota law, however, limits the right of private-sector workers to
strike in a way that the NLRA does not. Under federal law, it is not an unfair
labor practice for union members to strike when their contract is not open to
renegotiation, but under section 179.11 of the Minnesota Statutes, this is an un-
fair labor practice. See McLean Distribution Co., 94 N.W.2d at 521; see also
supra note 92.
96. Section 179.12(7) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
[t]o engage or contract for the services of a person who is an employee
of another if the employee is paid a wage that is less than the wage to
be paid by the contractor or contracting employer under an existing
union contract for work of the same grade or classification.
MINN. STAT. § 179.12(7) (1992). The legislature apparently directed this lan-
guage at the common employer practice of subcontracting or outsourcing a
union's bargaining unit work, usually done in the absence of a strike. Plainly,
the purpose of the law is to remove any cost-saving to an employer in substi-
tuting subcontracted labor for the bargaining unit. However, the language
could also be construed to limit an employer's use of a subcontractor during a
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fessional strikebreakers.9 In 1991, the Minnesota Legislature
added to these employer prohibitions by passing the Picket
Line Peace Act. The Act, modeled on legislation then pending
in the U.S. Congress, 98 makes it an unfair labor practice for a
private-sector employer "[t]o grant or offer to grant the status
of permanent replacement employee to a person for performing
bargaining unit work for an employer during a lockout of em-
ployees in a labor organization or during a strike of employees
in a labor organization authorized by a representative of em-
ployees."9 9 An almost identical provision applies to public sec-
tor employers.10 0
On May 31, 1991, Minnesota's Republican Governor, Arne
Carlson, vetoed the Act.101 The Chief Clerk of the Democrat-
controlled House of Representatives, however, contended that
the Governor's veto violated the state constitution 0 2 and deliv-
ered the bill to the Secretary of State for certification. 0 3 The
district court declared the veto invalid' 04 and the bill became
strike unless an employer paid wages equal to those under the labor contract
to employees of the subcontractor.
97. MINN. STAT. § 179.12(8) (1992) (making it an unfair labor practice for
an employer "[w]ilfully and knowingly to utilize a professional strikebreaker
to replace an employee or employees involved in a strike... at a place of busi-
ness located within this state"). This provision limits an employer's use of re-
placement workers during a strike. Its reference to "professional
strikebreaker," however, clearly suggests that an employer could distinguish a
permanent striker replacement from a transient worker employed periodically
as a strikebreaker. Thus, this provision probably provides strikers little or no
actual protection against an employer's hiring of permanent striker
replacements.
98. See supra note 2 (discussing the then-pending federal legislation).
99. Act of June 1, 1991, ch. 239, sec. 1, § 179.12(9), 1991 Minn. Laws 728,
729.
100. Act of June 1, 1991, ch. 239, see. 2, § 179A.13, subd. 2(12), 1991 Minn.
Laws 728, 730.
101. Seventy-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Carlson, No. C3-91-7547,
slip op. at 3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 2, 1991).
102. The Governor failed to return the veto within the mandated time pe-
riod. Id-, slip op. at 15. The relevant constitutional provision states:
Every bill passed in conformity to the rules of each house and the
joint rules of the two houses shall be presented to the governor.... If
he vetoes a bill, he shall return it with his objections to the house in
which it originated.... Any bill not returned by the governor within
three days (Sundays excepted) after it is presented to him becomes a
law as if he had signed it, unless the legislature by adjournment
within that time prevents its return.
MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 23
103. Seventy-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Carlson, No. C3-91-7547
slip op. at 20-21. (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 2, 1991).
104. I&, slip op. at 20, 28. The legislature originally petitioned the Minne-
sota Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction over the veto contro-
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law. 05
On its face, the new law appeared to conflict directly with
the Mackay Radio doctrine permitting employers to hire per-
manent striker replacements.'06 It was first challenged on
these grounds in Midwest Motor Ex'press v. Local 120, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters.0 7 In upholding the constitu-
tionality of the Minnesota law, the district court rejected
Midwest Motor's argument that the legislature's real intent was
to negate the Mackay Radio doctrine permitting the hiring of
permanent replacements, rather than to maintain picket line
safety. 0 8 The court concluded that the legislature's dominant
intent was to prevent picket line violence during strikes involv-
ing permanent replacements, not to promote equality of bar-
gaining power.'0 9
The Act met a different fate in federal court. In Employ-
ers Ass'n, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America,110 Judge Ro-
senbaum concluded that the Act:
does not selectively address the right of an employee, an employer, or
the State to redress picket line violence. Instead, the State's blanket
prohibition of hiring permanent striker replacements directly inter-
feres with an employer's federally protected right to do so. The
State's attempt to avoid picket line violence by a blunderbuss prohibi-
tion of a practice which has been protected by over fifty years of
versy. Seventy-Seventh Minnesota Senate v. Carlson, 472 N.W.2d 99 (Minn.
1991). The court rejected the legislature's petition, holding that the matter
should be determined by the district court. Id. at 99-100.
105. MINN. STAT. § 179.12(9) (1992).
106. See supra text accompanying note 99 (quoting the Act).
107. 139 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2563 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 26, 1992), affl'd, No. C6-
92-1126, 1993 WL 7182 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1993). The union in this case
struck Midwest Motor in August 1991 after failing to agree on a new labor
contract. Id at 2563. In response, Midwest Motor expressed an intent to hire
permanent replacements if the economy improved and sought an injunction to
prevent any interference by the strikers. Id at 2564. Eventually, Midwest
Motor and the Teamsters agreed upon picket line procedures, but Midwest
Motor sued the Teamsters to resolve the constitutionality of Minnesota's
newly enacted prohibition against hiring permanent replacements. Id.
108. Id. at 2566. Referring to the Picket Line Peace Act, the court ob-
served that "[in Minnesota the public policy issue is prevention of violence on
the picket line and during a strike situation. Its concern is one of public
safety." Id
109. Id at 2565. The court observed: "The subject of violence on the
picket line and in a strike situation was advanced before legislative committees
in strong words .... ." Id at 2565-66. It concluded: "Minn. Stat. s 179.12(9) is
not preempted because the State of Minnesota has a legitimate interest in reg-
ulating this area to prevent violence and to promote the peaceful settlement
and negotiating in strike situations." Id. at 2566.
110. 803 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Minn. 1992).
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Supreme Court precedent cannot stand.111
He thus held the Act to be preempted by the NLRA.m As the
passage above indicates, however, in reaching his decision,
Judge Rosenbaum never questioned the validity of the Mackay
Radio doctrine on which it depended. Indeed, he specifically
rejected the State's attempt to call the doctrine into doubt,
choosing to "follow Mackay Radio and its unvarying prog-
eny."113 An appellate court may have greater latitude to con-
sider the matter more fully. 14
Thus far, Minnesota courts remain unconvinced. After
Employers Ass'n, the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued its
opinion in the appeal of Midwest Motor Express.1 15 The court,
111. Id at 1567 (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 1565.
113. Id at 1565 n.9.
114. In addition, an appellate court may consider other apparent errors
that detract from the significance of the Employers Ass'n decision. Unlike
Midwest Motor Express, which involved a legal controversy arising out of an
actual strike, the decision in Employers Ass'n was not based on a particular
strike. Compare id. at 1563 with Midwest Motor Express v. Local 120, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 139 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2563 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 26, 1992),
affl'd, No. C6-92-1126, 1993 WL 7182 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1993). On appeal,
the decision can thus be challenged on the ground that the court improperly
exercised subject matter jurisdiction where no justiciable case or controversy
existed between the parties. See Employers Ass'n, 803 F. Supp. at 1562-63
(describing United Steelworker's argument).
The decision can also be challenged on abstention grounds, having been
rendered while the Minnesota Court of Appeals was reviewing constitutional
issues raised in Midwest Motor Express. Id. at 1563. In a similar case, Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Preate, a federal district court in Pennsylvania employed
the abstention doctrine to deny a newspaper's motion to enjoin Pennsylvania's
enforcement of its Strikebreaker Act. 797 F. Supp. 436, 440-41 (W.D.Pa. 1992),
affl'd, No. 92-3486, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 33096 (3d Cir. Nov. 3, 1992); see also
Bardane Mfg. Co. v. Jarbola, 724 F. Supp. 336, 342 (M.D.Pa. 1989) (holding that
a provision of Pennsylvania's Strikebreaker Act requiring employers to give
notice to replacement workers that the employment offered is in place of
striking employees is not preempted by the NLRA). The Pennsylvania Act
made an employer's hiring of a "strikebreaker" during a "labor dispute" un-
lawful. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 217.23(a) (1992). In deciding the abstention issue
before it, the Pittsburgh Press court held that "subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking and the [employer's] complaint must be dismissed" because "Penn-
sylvania has an interest in maintaining peace during labor disputes and that
interest extends to the public and the parties." 797 F. Supp. at 440 (citing
Bardane, 724 F. Supp. at 342). The court reasoned further that "[ilt would be
particularly inappropriate for a federal court ... to render a decision on a
question that goes to the heart of a ruling by a state court trial judge and is
now pending before a state appellate court." Id Though the district court
rendered its decision in Pittsburgh Press on August 14, 1992, the court in Em-
ployers Ass'n failed to cite it. See Employers Ass'n, 803 F. Supp. at 1565.
115. Midwest Motor Express v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120,
No. C6-92-1126, 1993 WL 7182 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1993).
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affirming the district court's decision, upheld the law; it did not
discuss, however, the public safety argument.116 Instead, the
court responded to Judge Rosenbaum's constitutional concerns
and held that the Act only applies to prevent the hiring of
replacements that would be considered "permanent" under
Minnesota contract law rather than federal labor law.' 17
"Those that have no connection to state contract law would be
outside the reach of the statute as we construe it,"118 the court
said, leaving such replacements permissible under federal law.
As Stephen Gordon, the attorney representing the union in
Midwest Motor Express, commented regarding the developing
conflict between state and federal law, "The only definitive res-
olution is the U.S. Supreme Court."1 19
VI. QUESTIONS OF PREEMPTION
The Supreme Court's application of preemption principles
to the NLRA would suggest at first that the Mackay Radio doc-
trine should displace the Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act. In
the landmark labor law preemption decision, San Diego Build-
ing Trades Council v. Garmon,20 the Court held that state law
must yield "[w]hen it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the
activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by
section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act."' 2 1 In addition,
reflecting its especially protective treatment of the NLRA, the
Court held that states may not regulate conduct that is even ar-
guably protected by the Act: "When an activity is arguably
subject to section 7... of the Act, the States as well as the fed-
eral courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference
with national policy is to be averted."'2 2 Because the Minne-
sota law appears to redress the inequality of bargaining power
arising from employers' increased use of permanent striker
replacements, which Mackay Radio says the NLRA allows, the
law would appear to be readily preempted-as Judge Rosen-
116. I& at *2. The court stated: "We do not base our holding on respon-
dent's claim that the legislature's concern about strike-related violence brings
the statute under an exception to federal labor law preemption." 1d.
117. Id. at *5.
118. Id.
119. Jill Hodges, State Court Narrows Definition in Upholding 'Strike-
breaker' Law, MPLS. STAR-TRm., Jan. 19, 1993, at 6B.
120. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
121. Id at 244.
122. Id- at 245.
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baum held.-2 3
Recently, however, Professor Michael Gottesman suggested
that the preemption doctrine developed by the Supreme Court
should be re-examined and narrowed in light of the sweeping
changes that have occurred in the last thirty-five years.'2 He
noted that the NLRA's fundamental purpose was to create
equality of bargaining power between workers and employ-
ers;125 when Garmon was decided in 1958, private sector unioni-
zation was almost three times more prevalent than in 1989.126
Gottesman therefore concluded that "the NLRA is not working
effectively and the institution of collective bargaining is in de-
cline.... Congress has shown itself too politically paralyzed to
make repairs."'127 He observed that, at the same time, "many
states are showing increasing enthusiasm for creating law to
protect employee interests. These opposite paths invite inquiry
whether state law may bolster the sagging NLRA."'128 In short,
Gottesman suggested that Garmon's preemptive reach was
broadly constructed to insulate the federal policy favoring
worker organization against historic intrusions by states; but
state laws clearly supporting federal policy should not be neces-
sarily preempted.129
In addition to Garmon preemption, a separate line of au-
thority, under Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,130 has resulted
in preemption of state regulations that intrude impermissibly
on the balance of economic weapons reserved to employers and
workers under the NLRA.' 3 ' The Garmon and Machinists
lines of preemption suggest that states lack power to alter the
regulation of economic weapons set forth under the NLRA.
Consequently, the Minnesota statute appears to be preempted
123. Employers Ass'n v. United Steelworkers of America, 803 F. Supp. 1558,
1565 (D. Minn. 1992).
124. See Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State
Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 356 (1990).
125. I& at 357.
126. See id. at 362 & n.25 (in 1958, 38% of the private-sector workforce was
unionized, but in 1989, only 13.8% was unionized).
127. Id at 360.
128. Id. at 360-61.
129. Id. at 426.
130. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
131. In Machinists itself, the Court preempted a state agency's order that
restricted workers from using a limited work action (refusal to work over-
time) in support of their collective bargaining strategy. Id at 154-55.
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because it alters the regulation of strike and strike-response
weapons set forth under the NLRA and Mackay Radio.
As Gottesman suggested, however, preemption is not a doc-
trine to be applied mechanically; instead, its proper application
requires analysis of context. The context of labor-management
relations has changed perceptibly since Professor Archibald
Cox set forth his foundation principles of preemption, cited as
authority by the Supreme Court in Machinists.132 Most signifi-
cantly, employers no longer use permanent replacements for
valid business reasons, such as continuing operations through a
strike, but rather use them abusively to break unions. 33 With
these thoughts in mind, the Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act
should not be so easily preempted, as the following issues
suggest.
The first issue relates to whether the Minnesota Legisla-
ture intended to protect the public against the increased likeli-
hood of violence occasioned by strikes in which permanent
replacements are hired. Long before the Minnesota Legisla-
ture had enacted the Picket Line Peace Act, it had specifically
prohibited strikers from "interfer[ing] with the free and unin-
terrupted use of public roads, streets, highways, or methods of
transportation . . . or to wrongfully obstruct ingress to and
egress from any place of business or employment."'' More-
over, this restriction specifically constituted as "an unfair labor
practice for any employee or labor organization .... ,-135 The
state, therefore, has clearly had a long-standing concern about
132. Id at 140 n.4 ("Congress struck a balance of protection, prohibition,
and laissez-faire in respect to union organization, collective bargaining, and la-
bor disputes that would be upset if a state could also enforce statutes or rules
of decision resting upon its views concerning accomodation of the same inter-
ests.") (quoting Archibald Cox, Labor Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1337, 1352 (1972)).
133. See supra note 45 (survey results regarding use of permanent replace-
ments); see also JOHN J. LAWLER, UNIONIZATION AND DEUNIONIZATION:
STRATEGIES, TACTICS AND OUTCOMES 182 (1990):
In what seems to be an increasingly common scenario, an employer
either forces or takes advantage of a strike to secure deunionization
.... [I]n a protracted strike in which the employer holds fast to its
position, discord is apt to build among striking the employees, leading
some to return to work; the employer may also hire permanent
replacements for the strikers. This then sets the stage for a decertifi-
cation effort... an RM petition, or withdrawal of recognition.
Id (citations omitted).
134. Act of April 22, 1939, ch. 440, § 13, 1939 Minn. Laws 985, 993 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 179.13(1) (1992)).
135. -Act of April 24, 1943, ch. 624, sec. 4, § 179.13(2), 1943 Minn. Laws 936,
938.
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spillover effects from mass union picketing that imperil public
safety.136 Thus, the Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act simply
extends state regulation of picket line conduct; the Act is
clearly not the legislature's first foray in this policy area. The
Act stands as a reciprocal restriction against employer conduct
that tends to incite picketers. Given that Minnesota exper-
ienced a profoundly bitter and occasionally violent strike in the
mid-1980s, the public safety rationale for the Act appears
sound. The Supreme Court's general acceptance of state regu-
lations that protect property and public welfare further support
the Act.1 3 7
The second issue centers on whether, assuming that the
legislature actually intended to redress a perceived inequality
of bargaining power between Minnesota workers and their em-
ployers, either of Garmon's precepts or the Machinists rule
would preempt the Act.
Under Garmon's "actual conflict" precept,13 8 the Minne-
sota law raises a paradox. It conflicts with no provision of the
NLRA, since the NLRA is completely silent on the matter of
an employer's right to hire permanent replacements. Never-
theless, the law clearly violates the doctrine from Mackay Ra-
dio conferring on an employer the right to hire permanent
replacements. Thus, the paradox: Is Supreme Court dicta the
constitutional equivalent of express statutory law for the pur-
pose of preempting conflicting state law?
There would be particular irony in presenting the current
Court with this issue. In early 1992, the Court in Lechmere,
136. See McQuay, Inc. v. United Automobile Workers, 72 N.W.2d 81 (Minn.
1955), affl'd, 351 U.S. 959 (1956) (holding that federal labor law did not pre-
empt state courts from granting employers injunctive relief under this provi-
sion, where the union was obstructing highways and plant entrances,
interfering with vehicles and their operators, and engaging in mass picketing
which led to assaults, coercion, and intimidation of people working through
the strike); see also Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Local 544, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, 379 N.W.2d 539 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that the union violated a
restraining order when its members engaged in acts of violence by blocking an
employer's entrances).
137. See, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290,
299-300 (1977); United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 274-75 (1956); Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec.
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1942).
138. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)
("When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State
purports to regulate are protected-by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
... due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must
yield.").
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Inc. v. NLRB'L39 sharply curtailed the right of unions to gain ac-
cess to nonunion workplaces for the purpose of union organiz-
ing. Union members in Lechmere had placed handbills on the
windshields of cars parked in the employee parking lot of a
large shopping mall to inform currently unorganized mall em-
ployees of the advantages of union representation.140 Although
the union did not interfere with any employee's work, the
mall's management forced the union to leave the property.14 '
The NLRB ruled that the mall improperly denied the union ac-
cess to mall employees under its Jean Country doctrine, which
weighed the employer's property rights against an employees'
right to organize under the NLRA.142  A majority of the
Supreme Court, however, refused to defer to the Board's pre-
sumed expertise in formulating labor-management policy.143 In
arriving at its decision, the Court quoted section 7 of the
NLRA, which "provides in relevant part that '[e]mployees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations.' "144 It noted that "[b]y its plain terms, thus, the
NLRA confers rights only on employees, not on unions or their
nonemployee organizers."'145 The Court continued:
In cases involving employee activities, we noted with approval, the
Board 'balanced the conflicting interests of employees to receive in-
formation on self-organization on the company's property... with the
employer's right to control the use of his property.' In cases involving
nonemployee activities.., the Board was not permitted to engage in
that same balancing .... 146
Since the present Court gave literal effect to statutory pro-
visions in the NLRA in Lechmere, it follows that in evaluating
the constitutionality of Minnesota's statute, the Court should
also give literal effect to section 13 of the NLRA. Section 13
provides: "Nothing in this Act . . .shall be construed so as
either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
right to strike . . . ."147 A showing that hiring permanent
replacements interfered with, impeded, or diminished in any
way the right to strike would seem to make it difficult for the
139. 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
140. I& at 848.
141. Id
142. Id. at 847-48; see Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 14 (1988).
143. See Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 853 (White, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 845 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988)).
145. I&
146. I& at 848 (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 109-
10 (1956)).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988) (emphasis added).
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Court to favor its Mackay Radio dictum over the literal provi-
sions of the NLRA.
Under Garmon's "arguable conflict" precept,148 Mackay
Radio's unquestioned validity as precedent concerning perma-
nent striker replacements provides a forceful argument for pre-
empting Minnesota's law. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Independent Federation of Might Attendants, 49 the Supreme
Court cited Mackay Radio as support to enlarge employer
rights to use replacements to circumvent strikes. 50 Therefore,
to allow Minnesota's statute to coexist with the Supreme
Court's well-developed policy permitting employers to hire per-
manent replacements would arguably present a conflict of
authority.
Although this argument is compelling, it is hard to square
with the Supreme Court's decision in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale.'5'
The Court there examined whether the NLRA preempted state
contract and misrepresentation claims of employees who were
hired as permanent replacements, and who were then dis-
missed when strikers returned to work pursuant to a strike set-
tlement agreement that provided for reinstatement of
strikers.152 The Court affirmed the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals' ruling that the NLRA did not preempt the replacement
workers' state contract and misrepresentation claims.
53
In its defense, Belknap had argued that unless the Ken-
tucky claims were preempted, the result would be to expose it
"to costly suits for damages under state law for entering into
settlements calling for the return of strikers" and to establish
policy that would "conflict with the federal labor policy favor-
ing the settlement of labor disputes."' 54  The Court rejected
this argument, concluding that
when an employer attempts to exercise this very privilege by promis-
ing the replacements that they will not be discharged to make room
148. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959)
("When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [National Labor Re-
lations] Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclu-
sive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state
interference with national policy is to be averted.") (emphasis added).
149. 489 U.S. 426, 443 (1989) (holding that an employer is not required to
lay off junior crossover employees in order to reinstate core senior strikers at
the conclusion of a strike).
150. Id. at 433-34.
151. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
152. Id. at 493.
153. Id, at 512.
154. Id. at 499.
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for returning strikers, it surely does not follow that the employer's
otherwise valid promises of permanent employment are nullified by
federal law and its otherwise actionable misrepresentation may not be
pursued.1
55
This ruling arguably conflicts with federal labor policy that
encourages settlement of all disputes between labor and man-
agement. 5 6 Once employers hire permanent replacements,
they expose themselves to enormous liability if they dismiss
those replacements in favor of returning strikers. Thus, the
ruling creates a clear disincentive for an employer to seek a set-
tlement with a striking union. Justice Brennan summarized
this argument in dissent: "[These claims go to the core of fed-
eral labor policy. If respondents are allowed to pursue their
claims in state court, employers will be subject to potentially
conflicting state and federal regulation of their activities
... ,,15" He expressed concern over the threat the Belknap de-
cision would pose to "the efficient administration of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act" and the resulting change in "the
structure of the economic weapons Congress has provided to
parties to a labor dispute.' 158 Underscoring the conflict be-
tween state and federal law resulting from the holding in Bel-
knap, Brennan observed: "The potential for conflicting
regulation clearly exists in this case. Respondents' breach of
contract claim seeks to regulate activity that may well have
been required by federal law. Petitioner may have to answer in
damages for taking such action. This sort of conflicting regula-
tion is intolerable."' 59 In short, Belknap sets a precedent for
permitting states to regulate employer conduct concerning per-
manent replacements.
Finally, with respect to the Machinists rule, the Minnesota
Picket Line Peace Act may, at least arguably, help to restore
the balance established by the NLRA. Again, under a literal
reading of the NLRA, such as that applied by the Supreme
155. Id at 500.
156. The LIRA states:
[I]t is the policy of the United States that... sound and stable indus-
trial peace and the advancement of the general welfare, health, and
safety of the Nation and of the best interests of employers and em-
ployees can most satisfactorily be secured by the settlement of issues
between employers and employees through the processes of confer-
ence and collective bargaining between employers and the representa-
tives of their employees.
29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1988).
157. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 530.
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Court in Lechmere, permanent striker replacements should not
be allowed. In direct violation of section 13 of the NLRA, per-
manent replacements "interfere with," "impede," and "dimin-
ish" the right to strike.160 Thus, Mackay Radio nay be what is
disturbing the balance envisioned by Congress in passing the
NLRA. Congress intended strikes to be a potent weapon avail-
able to employees. The Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act may
simply be restoring that weapon to its intended stature.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since 1938, the Supreme Court has made public policy con-
cerning an employer's right to hire permanent replacements.
Its task has been difficult because it has had to "decide the
questions presented without any clear guidance from Con-
gress." 161 The Court's Mackay Radio dicta allowing permanent
replacements could possibly find support in the legislative his-
tory of the NLRA, common law precedents and statutes.162
Unfortunately, the Court has never articulated a legal justifica-
tion for its Mackay Radio doctrine. In its present form, there-
fore, the doctrine stands as a hollow principle. It seems
particularly hollow today, when the context of labor-manage-
ment relations has changed so dramatically from when the
Supreme Court decided Mackay Radio and set forth the princi-
ples of preemption.
Recently, the Court appears to have invited states to make
their own labor policy, and the door may be open to a reexami-
nation of the Mackay Radio doctrine. In Belknap, the Court
suggested that Garmon's preemption principles may not pro-
hibit all de facto state regulation of permanent replacements.
In Lechmere, the Court indicated a renewed willingness to read
the terms of the NLRA literally-a literal mindedness that
may lead the Court to conclude that permanent replacements
are not protected by the NLRA at all.
If the Court should ever consider whether the NLRA
preempts the Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act, or another
state equivalent, it would face some difficult questions if it were
to overturn such a law. The Court could cite Mackay Radio as
authority for overturning such legislation, but this runs the risk
160. See supra text accompanying note 147.
161. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. See Michael H. LeRoy, Changing Paradigms in the Public Policy of
Striker Replacements: Combination, Conspiracy, Concer4 and Cartelization,
34 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at 9-47, on file with author).
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of showing that the emperor has no clothes. How could a Court
that literally interprets the NLRA fail to give literal effect to
the NLRA's express prohibition against judicial construction
that diminishes, impedes, or interferes with the right to strike?
It could cite Garmon's broad principles of preemption, but this
could contradict the principles set forth in Belknap. It could
cite the Machinists rule, but then it would be preserving a bal-
ance between employers and employees established by the
Court alone, not by Congress in the NLRA. None of these re-
sults seems supportable.
In demonstrating its "unarticulated hostility toward
strikes,"'61 3 the Burger-Rehnquist Court has all too often
opened itself to the very criticism it makes of the Warren
Court: it has legislated and ignored express statutory language.
The Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act presents an excellent op-
portunity for the Court either to establish a solid jurispruden-
tial basis for the Mackay Radio doctrine, or to apply the same
"plain meaning" rule it applied in Lechmere and to overturn
the Mackay Radio doctrine altogether.
163. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants,
489 U.S. 426, 447 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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